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Introduction 
Implementation of integrated system health management (ISHM) capability is 
fundamentally linked to the management of data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) 
with the purposeful objective of determining the health of a system. It is akin to having a 
team of experts who are all individually and collectively observing and analyzing a 
complex system, and communicating effectively with each other in order to arrive to an 
accurate and reliable assessment of its health. We present concepts, procedures, and a 
specific approach as a foundation for implementing a credible ISHM capability. The 
capability stresses integration of DIaK from all elements of a subsystem. The intent is 
also to make possible implementation of on-board ISHM capability, in contrast to a 
remote capability. The information presented is the result of many years of research, 
development, and maturation of technologies, and of prototype implementations in 
operational systems (rocket engine test facilities). The paper will address the following 
topics:  
1. ISHM Model of a system 
2. Detection of anomaly indicators. 
3. Determination and confirmation of anomalies. 
4. Diagnostic of causes and determination of effects. 
5. Consistency checking cycle. 
6. Sharing of health information 
7. Sharing of display information 
8. Storage and retrieval of health information 
9. Example implementation 
ISHM Model of a System (Architecture and Taxonomy) 
 
The ISHM model encompasses DIaK needed to achieve ISHM capability. 
Data is available from sensors. Distribution of DIaK associated with physical elements of 
a system gives rise to an information architecture, specifically where intelligent processes 
at various levels of granularity are executed (See Figure 1). The architecture embodies 
intelligent sensor and component processes (valve, tank, etc.) at the lowest level, and 
intelligent processes associated with combinations of sensors and components (or 
subsystems) at higher levels. Higher levels of abstraction are embodied at higher 
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architectural levels, where these obtain data and information from lower levels and 
execute process models that essentially allow for checking the consistency of lower level 
information. Hence, data and information flow first from lower levels to higher levels. At 
each level, consistency checks are done using knowledge (process models). Results of the 
consistency checks flow to levels below, eventually reaching the sensors and 
components, in order to help these elements improve their assessment of health. Results 
of the consistency check flow to levels above for additional checks. In this manner, 
consistency checks at all levels are used to determine the health of sensors and 
components (hence the system). 
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Sensor Processes utilize data; hence, data must be available at each intelligent sensor 
process. Processes within intelligent sensors must assess the quality of the data and the 
health of the sensor. These processes may reside in physical intelligent sensors or virtual 
ones (that turn legacy sensors into intelligent ones). 
 
Element Processes (or component processes) can be encapsulated within an element 
such as a tank or valve. Eventually, Element Processes must have available data and 
information from sensors that are installed specifically as an integral part of that element 
(e.g. position feedback on a valve).  
 
Subsystem Processes consume information from Sensor and Element Processes 
(primarily health, but also transducer data sheets and data); and update health related 
parameters on sensors and elements. These processes also might provide inputs to 
external predictive models and get back their outputs.  
 
System Processes and higher levels are similar to subsystem processes, except that they 
will require data and information from lower levels more sporadically. They will 
primarily consume health information and push back down information to improve health 
assessment at lower levels. 
Detection of Anomaly Indicators 
Indicators at Sensors 
Indicators that can be detected with localized sensor information and data. For example, 
excessive noise, spikes, etc. These indicators can lead to detection of anomalies, e.g. 
unattached thermocouple (combination of high noise, perhaps 60 Hz interference, and 
time response that is not consistent with the measurand’s time constant). However, for 
anomaly detection, additional information from the process in which the sensor 
participates is often needed; e.g. the time constant of the measurand. 
Indicators at Components 
Generally, an anomaly indicator at a component is a result of reasoning that involves data 
and information from sensors and models of processes in the component e.g. pressurized 
tank, tank fill, valve state, etc. In this case, what is needed are sensor data, a measure of 
the quality of the data, and sensor health (perhaps just good, suspect, and bad health 
states), and process models to detect anomaly indicators by checking consistency of 
sensors and model. 
 
The architecture, standards, and object classes should allow automatic (standardized) 
access of information to run the process models, and make models outputs available to 
other models for further inferences. 
Detection and Confirmation of Anomalies 
Detection and confirmation of anomalies are done through use of process models that 
involve a sensor, a component and associated sensors, and combinations of components 
and sensors that might be defined as subsystems for the application of specific process 
models (strategies).  
Anomalies at Sensors 
Some anomalies might be determined using localized data and information, however, 
confirmation of an anomaly will come from models that incorporate one or more 
components. The approach to confirmation is to let the sensors know when their health 
assessment is not consistent with the assessment at higher levels. 
Predictive Process Models (PPMs) 
Predictive models might be considered as specialized “virtual” sensors that provide 
predicted sensor readings. PPMs are considered to be a special type of virtual intelligent 
sensors.  
 
The highest priority of ISHM is to determine sensor anomalies. 
Anomalies at Components 
Anomalies at components, e.g. valve stuck, can be determined with data and information 
from the valve, its sensors, and a process model describing a stuck condition. However, 
just as in the case of sensors, if this assessment is not consistent with higher level models 
(that include the valve), it will need to be communicated to the valve. 
 
The second highest priority of ISHM is to determine component anomalies. 
Anomalies at Subsystems, Systems, etc. 
Methods that can capture anomalies at some subsystem or system (e.g. leak) level could 
be treated as PPMs. The output should be treated as its own virtual sensor that simply 
determines if a system has an anomaly. 
Diagnostic of causes and determination of effects 
Detection of events and determination of causes and effects should be inferred and 
analyzed within the ISHM Model.  Sensor information such as rate of increase or 
decrease, and health parameters (noisy, etc.) should be provided to the ISHM model. 
Sensor data is needed for display purposes. Initially, one could build two models; one for 
ISHM and another for Display. Other display applications might use data (values + 
health) provided the sensors and the ISHM Model.  
Consistency checking cycle 
This addresses the problem of where to begin the cycle of consistency checking that leads 
to anomaly (indicators) detection and diagnostics. Locally assessed health information 
should be done first to feed higher level process models. At every level upward, re-
assessment of health information should flow down. The following cycle should be 
implemented: 
1. Initiation: All sensor local health assessment done. 
2. Level 1 process models and re-assessment of sensor health (each sensor should 
have a consistency value for each process in which it participates with a value of 
consistent, not defined, or not consistent), However, a Sensor could push-back at 
process model that indicates it is faulty when other models indicate otherwise. 
3. Assessment of component health based on good sensor information and process 
models. 
Sharing of health information 
“Real-Time” health information from sensors and components should be shared using the 
IEEE 1451.1 standard. Other health information should be shared using the OSA-CBM 
standard. 
Sharing of Display Information 
Display information should include health and data. It should also include “real time” and 
“historic information.” 
Storage and retrieval of health information 
Along with data, a history of health information should be stored for retrieval by any 
user. 
Example Implementation 
An example implementation constituting a complete ISHM capability will be described. 
The implementation will include software and hardware developed in recent years; and it 
will describe an application to an operational system. 
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